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	 	 Abstract
This article considers to what extent European law invites – or 
requires – inapplicability of the so called ‘speciality principle’ in Dutch admin-
istrative law. I shall be concentrating on the question to what extent an admin-
istrative authority considering whether or not to grant a permit is permitted, 
or required, to take public interests into account other than those of the permit 
system in question, and specifically those based on European law. More particu-
larly I will be discussing whether an administrative authority is permitted, or 
even required, to refuse a permit or other decision on the ground that it is contrary 
to European law obligations, even when the objectives of the applicable Euro-
pean law are broader than the assessment framework laid down by the national 
legislation on which the decision is based. I will also be referring to the opposite 
situation: Is an administrative authority permitted, or perhaps required, to grant 
a permit or other decision, despite the constraints of the assessment framework of 
national law, in order to avoid taking a decision that contravenes European law?
	 1	 Introduction
Government should serve the public interest, but within 
bounds set and exercising rights and powers conferred by the legislature. 
This clearly demonstrates the direct connection between the principle of 
legality and democracy. Nevertheless, the principle of legality would have 
little effect if the legislature were to confer unlimited or virtually unlimited 
rights and powers on the administration to further the public interest. This 
is why these rights and powers are specifically defined and are conferred to 
attain specific objectives. Dutch administrative law, for example, is based on 
the principle that public authorities do not have general powers to promote 
the public interest, but only specific – objective-related – powers. This is 
expressed most clearly in the prohibition of détournement de pouvoir (abuse 
of power) in Article 3:3 of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht (General Admin-
istrative Law Act, Awb), which states: ‘An administrative authority shall not 
use the power to make an order for a purpose other than that for which it 
was conferred.’ This means that when exercising a power an administrative 
  Other ‘traces’ of this can be found in e.g. Article 3:4.2 Awb: ‘When making an order the 
administrative authority shall weigh the interests directly involved in so far as no limitation 
on this duty derives from a statutory regulation or the nature of the power being exercised.’ 
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authority will have to consider the purpose for which that power was con-
ferred, which often emerges from the legislation conferring the power.2
In short, when exercising public law powers administrative authorities 
may not further public interests other than those with a view to which the 
power was conferred.3 In Dutch administrative law this is known as the 
‘speciality principle’. The decision of the Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak Raad 
van State (Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State) in the 
Maasdriel case will serve as an example.4 
The mayor of Maasdriel had refused to grant a local hunting society a permit 
to shoot clay pigeons, required under a municipal bylaw. He refused the 
permit because he felt that granting it would mean acting contrary to both 
the Flora- en Faunawet (Flora and Fauna Act) and the Wet wapens en munitie 
(Weapons and Munitions Act). The purpose of the municipal permit system 
is to protect public order. The Raad van State held that the interests served 
by the two acts were not so closely linked with the interests on which the 
grounds named in the bylaw for refusing a permit were based that ‘the mere 
circumstance that the intended use of the permit is incompatible with the 
Flora- en Faunawet or the Wet wapens en munitie should be a reason to refuse 
this permit.’ In other words, the mayor’s powers could only be used in the 
context of protecting public order and not to serve conservation interests 
(Flora- en Faunawet) or to regulate the use of firearms (Wet wapens en muni-
tie).
Nevertheless, one wonders how the Raad van State would decide if the 
permit were contrary to the directly effective rule in Article 6(3) of the 
EC Habitats Directive or were otherwise contrary to European law. Does 
European law require that the speciality principle be disregarded in such a 
situation?
This question is largely ignored in the Dutch literature on administra-
tive law. In the most important book on the speciality principle, Schlössels 
points out that primary and secondary EC law can of course influence the 
objectives of national legislation conferring powers.6 It goes without saying, 
Cf. at European level Article  EC: ‘The Community shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.’ In the 
literature this is referred to as the ‘principle of conferral’.
2  Cf. e.g. Article 8.0 Wet milieubeheer (Environmental Management Act): ‘A licence may be 
refused only in the interests of environmental protection.’ 
3  L.J.A. Damen et al., Bestuursrecht 1 (Den Haag 200), p. 60. 
4  Raad van State 29 April 2003, LJN: AF8028. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of 
the Council of State is the country’s highest administrative court with general jurisdiction.
  Directive 92/43; Cf. on the direct effect of Article 6(3), ECJ Case C-27/02 Waddenvereniging 
and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging [2004] ECR I-740.
6  R.J.N. Schlössels, Het specialiteitsbeginsel (Den Haag 998), pp. 8-9.
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he says, ‘that a national objective-related administrative power should 
where appropriate be exercised in conformity with the rules on the appli-
cation of Community law. For example, under certain circumstances the 
national legislation conferring the powers may have to be interpreted so as 
to conform with a directive.’ Disappointingly, he observes in the following 
sentence that he will not be discussing this further.
This article considers to what extent European law invites – or requires – 
inapplicability of the speciality principle in Dutch administrative law. I shall 
be concentrating on the question to what extent an administrative authority 
considering whether or not to grant a permit is permitted, or required, to 
take public interests into account other than those of the permit system in 
question, and specifically those based on European law. More particularly I 
will be discussing whether an administrative authority is permitted, or even 
required, to refuse a permit or other decision on the ground that it is contrary 
to European law obligations, even when the objectives of the applicable 
European law are broader than the assessment framework laid down by the 
national legislation on which the decision is based. I will also be referring to 
the opposite situation: Is an administrative authority permitted, or perhaps 
required, to grant a permit or other decision, despite the constraints of the 
assessment framework of national law, in order to avoid taking a decision 
that contravenes European law?
	 2	 	Applicability	where	there	is	a	Specific	Statutory	
System
Let us return to the case outlined in the introduction. What 
if granting the permit to shoot clay pigeons were contrary to Article 6(3) of 
the Habitats Directive? Would the mayor have been right to refuse it then? 
Bear in mind that the Habitats Directive was transposed into Dutch legisla-
tion in the Natuurbeschermingswet (Nature Conservation Act) and the Flora- 
en Faunawet. It seems to me indisputable that to the extent the protection 
of habitats in the Netherlands required by European law is extended within 
the framework of the Natuurbeschermingswet and/or the Flora- en Faunawet 
– and this legislation is a full and precise implementation of the Habitats 
Directive – there is no need to involve Article 6(3) in the assessment frame-
work of the local bylaw. Of course, the problem is solved if a permit to shoot 
clay pigeons is required under the Natuurbeschermingswet because of the 
possible effects on a special protection area. In that case there would be 
no conceivable reason to take directly effective European law into account 
when applying local legislation. Proper application of the Natuurbescher-
mingswet and/or the Flora- en Faunawet would ensure that nothing was done 
that would contravene European law. Problems only arise if a permit is not 
required under either of these laws. In that case, other means will have to be 
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found, based on some other statutory system, which will make it possible to 
take a different decision and so ensure that European law is not contravened. 
European law does not require that an administrative authority takes all 
directly effective European law into consideration for every decision it makes. 
Certainly, Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive must be observed, but from 
a European law point of view it is wholly irrelevant whether this is done by 
means of local or regional legislation or through national legislation such as 
the Natuurbeschermingswet or the Flora- en Faunawet. In other words, as long 
as the fulfilment of European law obligations can be guaranteed by or pursu-
ant to provisions of a legislative system, that is – from a European law point 
of view – sufficient.
The case law of the Dutch Raad van State seems to reflect the same view.7 
Consider, for example, a decision concerning the appeal of an environmen-
tal organisation against a permit granted under the Natuurbeschermingswet 
to plant and then harvest mussels and oysters from Ireland and the United 
Kingdom in the Eastern Schelde, or Oosterschelde, a national conservation 
area. According to the decision, the administrative authority primarily took 
the view that to refuse the permit would be contrary to the free movement 
of goods (Article 28 EC Treaty). The question that was at issue was therefore 
whether the assessment framework of the Natuurbeschermingswet, designed 
to protect nature, should be extended on European law grounds in order to 
permit the economic and market interests of Article 28 to play a part in the 
decision whether or not to grant a permit under the Natuurbeschermingswet. 
The Raad van State ruled that this was not necessary, because a permit to 
plant mussel seed was also required under the Visserijwet (Fisheries Act) 
and Article 28 EC could be considered in the context of that procedure.8 It 
observed that the case exclusively concerned aspects relating to the Natuurbe-
schermingswet and the scope of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive and that 
there was no place for review in the light of Article 28 EC. In other words, 
the assessment framework of the Natuurbeschermingswet, focusing explicitly 
on nature conservation, was not extended by Article 28 EC. In this case 
there was no European law need for this, as the interests Article 28 EC was 
intended to protect were safeguarded by the Visserijwet.
Even clearer is the case law of the Raad van State on the question to 
which statutory system the assessment framework of the Habitats Directive 
should be reckoned. The Netherlands was long in default regarding imple-
mentation of the Habitats Directive. Ultimately this resulted in the inclusion 
of a special section in the Natuurbeschermingswet, under which activities 
with possible significant effects on a special protection area would have to 
be subjected to a ‘special’ Habitats Directive test. Under Article 9d of the 
Natuurbeschermingswet it is prohibited, given the aim of preventing the dete-
rioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species and the disturbance 
7  Raad van State 22 March 2006, LJN: AV6289.
8  Cf. Raad van State 26 February 2003, [2003] M&R, nr. 92.
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of the species for which the areas have been designated, to carry out projects 
or other plans which could have such an effect on those habitats or species 
without a provincial permit or without observing any regulations or restric-
tions imposed by such a permit. According to the Raad van State it was the 
intention of the legislature when it passed this provision to create an exclu-
sive assessment framework and there is therefore no discretion to involve the 
assessment framework of the Habitats Directive in other statutory permit 
systems such as those under the Wet milieubeheer (Environmental Manage-
ment Act), the Woningwet (Housing Act), or the Wet op de Ruimtelijke �rde-
ning (Spatial Planning Act).9
	 3	 	Inapplicability	as	a	Consequence	of	the	
Requirement	of	Consistent	Interpretation?
As we know, administrative courts and administrative 
authorities are obliged to interpret national law as far as possible in con-
formity with European law.0 It is hardly surprising that this requirement of 
consistent interpretation can result in a change in the administrative assess-
ment framework. 
For example, it emerged from a decision of the Raad van State that Direc-
tive 200/8 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms had not been transposed into Dutch law, specifically the 
Wet milieugevaarlijke stoffen (Environmentally Dangerous Substances Act, 
Wms). Under the Wms, authorisation had been granted for small-scale trials 
with flowering genetically modified rape. Pursuant to the second paragraph 
of Article 26 Wms, the authorisation could only be refused ‘in the interest 
of the protection of man and the environment’. According to the court this 
statutory framework provided sufficient basis for the court to interpret in the 
light of the directive. The obligations set out in the directive, including the 
precautionary principle and the duty to carry out a specific environmental 
risk assessment in accordance with the criteria of Annex II of the direc-
tive, were ‘read into’ the national law. Clearly, this means that applicants 
are confronted with obligations arising out of a directive that has not been 
transposed.
However, the possibilities of consistent interpretation are limited. It is a 
method that is above all appropriate when the European assessment frame-
work is in effect an extension of the existing assessment framework of the 
national statutory system. However, it is not advisable to take consistent 
interpretation too far. In any event, it will not produce an extension of the 
9  Raad van State 2 February 2007, LJN: AZ9028.
0  Cf. J.H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal, R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law 
(Groningen 2007), in particular Chapter IV.
  Raad van State 28 June 2004, [2004] M&R, nr. 04 (with note by Jans).
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assessment framework where the assessment framework provided for by the 
national statutory system is exclusive.
Illustrative in this context is a decision of the Raad van State on possi-
ble consistent interpretation of the Dutch environmental legislation in the 
light of Article 9(4) of the IPPC Directive, at least in relation to agricultural 
installations.2 The case concerned an environmental permit granted for the 
keeping of several thousand chickens and several hundred pigs. A local resi-
dent contested the permit, relying among other things on Article 9(4) of the 
IPPC Directive. The ammonia deposits made possible by the permit were 
allegedly incompatible with the directive’s requirement that ‘best available 
techniques’ should be applied. The court, having established that the IPPC 
Directive did apply in the case, first examined whether the Dutch environ-
mental legislation could be interpreted in conformity with the directive, in 
other words whether the assessment framework of the IPPC Directive could 
be ‘read into’ the existing Dutch environmental legislation. However, in this 
case the legislation allowed the authorities no discretion whatever to refuse 
the permit or to apply the more stringent BAT requirements of the directive. 
Under the national legislation a permit to keep livestock could not be refused 
for reasons connected with ammonia deposits if the deposits that might be 
caused on the nearest area sensitive to acidity did not exceed the value set by 
law. In this case, the ammonia deposits remained below the statutory limit 
and so the permit had to be granted. As regards the possibility of interpret-
ing the law in conformity with the directive, the Raad van State observed 
that the national legislation in question constituted the ‘exclusive assessment 
framework’ for assessing the ammonia deposits of livestock farms, so that 
there was no room to apply insights of environmental hygiene connected 
with ammonia deposits other than those contained in the legislation. The 
conclusion was therefore inevitable: the national legislation allowed ‘no room 
to prescribe emission limit values based on best available techniques’.3
Another example of a statutory system for which the assessment frame-
work cannot be extended by means of consistent interpretation concerns the 
granting of building permits. Article 44() Woningwet provides: ‘A normal 
building permit may only and must be refused if: [...].’ There follows an 
exhaustive statement of a number of grounds for refusing a permit. In my 
view the exhaustive, mandatory system of the Woningwet precludes exten-
sion by the assessment framework of, for instance, the IPPC Directive or the 
air quality directives. Consistent interpretation cannot change an exhaustive 
system into one that is non-exhaustive. In fact, this would amount to a contra 
2  Raad van State 3 November 2002, [2003] M&R, nr. 39.
3  Nor is consistent interpretation an option, according to the Netherlands Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad), even if the national statutory framework would in itself allow it, if the 
legislature has during the legislative process, for example in explanatory memorandums, 
unambiguously expressed the deliberate intention of having the national regulations depart 
from what the directive requires or leaves free. Hoge Raad 0 August 2007, LJN: AZ378.
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legem interpretation of Article 44, as ‘may only and must be refused’ would 
then have to be interpreted as ‘may, inter alia, be refused’. Such an interpre-
tation would be unacceptable in the light of the principle of legal certainty 
and would almost certainly not be allowed.4
A final example of the limited possibilities of consistent interpretation is 
the following. From a case of the Raad van State it may be implied that the 
assessment framework that provincial authorities have to apply when approv-
ing municipal zoning plans cannot be interpreted so as to conform with 
Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive. The case concerned an appeal against 
approval by the provincial authorities of North Holland for the zoning plan 
on the island of Texel. Part of the area was designated a national conserva-
tion area and part was not. The Raad van State ruled that for the part desig-
nated a national conservation area the protection required by the Habitats 
Directive was assured by consistent interpretation of the Natuurbescher-
mingswet. However, for the part that did not fall under the protection of the 
Natuurbeschermingswet the Raad van State ruled that it saw no possibility of 
consistent interpretation, as there were no generally binding rules intended 
to implement the obligations arising under Article 6(2) of the directive. The 
lack of national legislation which could be interpreted in conformity with the 
directive made it impossible to take this route.
All that remains as a possible means of circumventing the speciality 
principle in such a situation, where it is impossible to apply consistent inter-
pretation, is the direct effect of European law.
	 4	 	Inapplicability	by	Means	of	Directly	Effective	
Provisions?
Reliance on European law by interested third parties?
That ‘third parties’ (including interest groups such as 
environmental organisations) can rely on directly effective provisions of 
European law before administrative courts, in addition to the applicant, 
is generally recognised in Dutch administrative law.6 Successful reliance 
results in annulment of the contested decision. I am aware of no example 
of case law in which a third party was denied reliance on directly effec-
tive European law because this was precluded by the statutory assessment 
4  Cf. on contra legem and consistent interpretation Case C-0/03 Pupino [200] ECR I-28.
  Here the Council of State applied an order of preference: first examine whether consistent 
interpretation is possible and only when this proves not to be the case consider direct effect; 
cf. Raad van State 3 November 2002, [2003] M&R, nr. 39 and most recently Raad van State 
 September 2007, 20060678/. Cf. also ECJ Case C-208/0 ITC [2007] ECR I-8, para. 
70. See also the contribution of Ortlep & Verhoeven to this volume of REALaw.
6  Cf. J.H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal, R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law 
(Groningen 2007), in particular Chapter III.
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framework. However, there are several – though not many – examples which 
justify the cautious conclusion that the speciality principle can indeed be 
rendered inapplicable as a result of third party reliance on directly effective 
European law. This emerges, albeit implicitly, from a decision of the Raad 
van State concerning the statutory system of permits required under the Wet 
op de Ruimtelijke �rdening.7
The case concerned a permit granted by a local authority to lay three arti-
ficial grass fields to replace three natural grass fields. Interested third parties 
objected, relying, among other things, on the Habitats Directive. It should 
be added that the case arose before the inclusion of the special and exclusive 
Habitats Directive test in the Natuurbeschermingswet (see section 2 above). 
Allegedly, the permit could have adversely affected the nearby conservation 
areas, which were listed among the habitat areas the Dutch Government had 
sent the Commission. However, at the time of the proceedings the Commis-
sion had not yet designated the areas as areas of Community interest. This 
meant that the European law protection of these areas could not be based 
directly on Articles 6(2) to (4) of the Habitats Directive, but had to be based 
on the general ‘good faith’ requirement not to take any measures that would 
jeopardise attainment of the objectives of the Habitats Directive.8 Like the 
Woningwet, discussed above, which provides  for an exhaustive, mandatory 
list of grounds for refusing to grant a building permit, the Wet op de Ruimte-
lijke �rdening  provides an exhaustive, mandatory list of grounds for refusing 
to grant a planning permit. It will be clear that this system also allows no 
room to refuse a permit on grounds of possible conflict with the European 
law good faith requirement. Nevertheless the Raad van State explicitly 
considered whether the laying of artificial grass fields was an activity by 
which attainment of the objectives of the conservation of natural habitats 
and wild flora and fauna might be jeopardised. It thereby implicitly acknowl-
edged that it may annul a permit that contravenes European law, even if 
the objectives of the European law in question are outside the scope of the 
national assessment framework.
Indeed, it has been pointed out that European law may also result 
in the exhaustive, mandatory system of the Woningwet being disapplied 
and a building permit being refused, despite the fact that all the crite-
ria mentioned in Article 44 as necessary for a permit to be granted are 
fulfilled.9 In this case not by means of consistent interpretation, but by 
direct effect. The authors give the fictitious example of the construction of 
a car park. If a permit were refused because a European law environmen-
7  Raad van State 6 March 200, LJN: AT040.
8  ECJ Case C-7/03 Societa Italiana Dragaggi [200] ECR I-67. This involves application of 
the ‘Inter-Environnement’ doctrine; ECJ Case C-29/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL 
v. Région wallonne [997] ECR I-74.
9  P.J.J. van Buuren, Ch.W. Backes, A.A.J. de Gier & A.G.A. Nijmeijer, Hoofdlijnen ruimtelijk 
bestuursrecht (Deventer 2006), p. 98.
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tal quality requirement was exceeded, it could be said that the exhaustive, 
mandatory system was extended as a result of European law.
A good illustration from the case law is a decision of the district court 
in Leeuwarden concerning the granting of a building permit for a pancake 
house near an area falling under the protection of the Birds Directive.20 The 
court annulled the permit on the ground that the administrative authority 
had failed to observe due care and had failed to give adequate reasons for 
its decision, as it had paid insufficient attention to the relevant European 
law.2 It seems that the court is thus neatly able to circumvent the exhaustive, 
mandatory system of the Woningwet. However, the question arises what the 
court would have decided if the administrative authority had taken Euro-
pean law into account. Would it have annulled the building permit then? My 
answer would be: Yes, it would. This was also the view of the district court 
in Zutphen,22 where the issue was whether the granting of a building permit 
for 44 recreational bungalows was contrary to Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive, given the effects on the Veluwe nature area, designated a special 
protection zone under both the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive. 
The court observed that Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive ‘had direct 
effect and could consequently thwart the exhaustive system of grounds for 
refusal of Article 44 of the Woningwet.’ As there was no question in this case 
of adverse effects within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Direc-
tive, the appeal was held unfounded.
However, a decision of the Raad van State in interim injunction proceed-
ings seems to suggest that the Raad van State may well think differently 
about extending the exhaustive, mandatory system by relying on European 
law.23 In its provisional opinion, it held that there was insufficient ground 
for the view that the Besluit luchtkwaliteit (Air Quality Order) could prevent 
the granting of building permits where the requirements of Article 44 of the 
Woningwet were fulfilled.
Application of European law by administrative authorities?
Above it was observed that the Raad van State will annul a permit where 
an interested third party invokes European law, even where the permit was 
properly granted under the national assessment framework. From the case 
law of the European Court of Justice, in particular Costanzo, it emerges that 
there is another side to the possibility of invoking directly effective European 
20  Rechtbank Leeuwarden 2 October 2000, [2003] M&R, nr. 28, with note by Bastmeijer.
2  See more extensively on this form of review: J.H Jans, ‘The Consequential Effect of Euro-
pean Law in Respect of the Requirement of Due Care’ [2007] Review of European Adminis-
trative Law, pp. 63-72.
22  Rechtbank Zutphen 4 January 2006, LJN: AV043. This judgment also predates the special 
Habitats Directive test in the Nature Conservation Act; see section 2 above.
23  Raad van State 28 October 200, LJN: AU387.
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law before a national court.24 Namely, the fact that administrative authorities 
are then also required to apply that same directly effective European law. In 
the words of the ECJ:
‘It is important to note that the reason for which an individual may […] rely 
on the provisions of a directive in proceedings before the national courts is 
that the obligations arising under those provisions are binding upon all the 
authorities of the Member States.
It would, moreover, be contradictory to rule that an individual may rely 
upon the provisions of a directive which fulfil the conditions defined above in 
proceedings before the national courts seeking an order against the admin-
istrative authorities, and yet to hold that those authorities are under no 
obligation to apply the provisions of the directive and refrain from applying 
provisions of national law which conflict with them. It follows that when the 
conditions under which the Court has held that individuals may rely on the 
provisions of a directive before the national courts are met, all organs of the 
administration, including decentralized authorities such as municipalities, are 
obliged to apply those provisions.’25
Given this observation, it is reasonable to assume that the Raad van State 
would require administrative authorities to apply directly effective Euro-
pean law even if this meant extending the existing assessment framework 
of the permit system in question. Unfortunately, however, things are not 
that simple. Let us therefore examine a number of decisions of the Raad van 
State in more detail.
Take, for example, a decision of 7 December 200.26 The case concerned 
the refusal by the municipal executive of Boxtel to grant an environmental 
permit for a pig and cattle farm. The refusal was based on the increase of 
ammonia deposits in a Habitats Directive area. In other words, the local 
authorities felt obliged to refuse a permit to ensure that the Habitats Direc-
tive would not be infringed if it was granted. However, the legislation 
provided that, as regards decisions concerning an environmental permit for 
the establishment or change of a livestock farm, the competent authority 
should only determine the consequences of ammonia emissions from the 
animals’ quarters on the farm in the manner provided for by law. In this 
case it was clear that the system of the law allowed no room to refuse the 
24  ECJ Case 03/88 Fratelli Costanzo [989] ECR 839, para. 3, later confirmed in Case C-
98/0 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi [2003] ECR I-80.
2  Cf. also para. 33 of Fratelli Costanzo: ‘that administrative authorities, including municipal 
authorities, are under the same obligation as a national court to apply the provisions of 
Article 29( ) of Council Directive 7/30/EEC and to refrain from applying provisions of 
national law which conflict with them’. 
26  Raad van State 7 December 200, [2006] M&R nr. 9. Cf. also Raad van State  February 
2006, LJN: AV099.
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permit. As regards the question whether the refusal could not then be based 
on the Habitats Directive the Raad van State observed: 
‘Given the wording of the law it was also not possible to interpret the law in 
the light of the wording and purpose of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Direc-
tive and base the contended decision on this interpretation. Nor could the 
respondent directly rely on Article 6(3) of the Directive vis-à-vis the appellant 
as a ground for refusing the permit, as no private individual has requested 
that in this case. It is established case law of the Court of the Justice of the 
European Communities that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on 
individuals and that the provision of a directive cannot as such be relied upon 
vis-à-vis an individual (Judgments of 26 February 1986 Marshall, C-152/84 
[1986] ECR 723; 14 July 1994 Faccini Dori, C-91/92 ECR I-3325 and 7 January 
2004 Wells, C-201/02 […]) This is precluded by the principle of legal certainty.’
Administrative authorities may not themselves refuse a permit as being 
contrary to the Habitats Directive unless a third party opposes the granting 
of the permit. The administrative authority must make its judgment based 
on the assessment framework set out in the national legislation. Adopting 
the Habitat Directive as a ground for refusal would, in the opinion of the 
Raad van State, amount to imposing obligations under the directive on an 
individual. In other words, the assessment framework of the national law 
remains effective and can only be extended where a third party relies on 
directly effective European law.
The case law of the Raad van State, as just discussed, amounts to the 
following: if an administrative authority grants a permit in accordance 
with the national assessment framework but contrary to a directly effective 
provision of a directive and a third party appeals against this, the Raad van 
State will annul the permit.27 In other words, the speciality principle will not 
immunise the permit against annulment as being contrary to European law, 
even if the European rules contain a different assessment framework from 
the one in the permit system.
However, if the administrative authority applies the directly effective 
provision itself by refusing a permit and the permit holder appeals against 
this, the decision will be annulled because, according to the Raad van State, 
this would amount to a form of improper horizontal effect – at any rate, if no 
basis can be found in national law for such a refusal. Administrative authori-
ties are thus faced with a difficult choice. If they apply national law and 
observe the speciality principle, the Raad van State will annul the decision 
as being contrary to the directive; if they apply European law, the Raad van 
State will annul the decision because they have ignored the national legal 
basis even though a directive cannot of itself be relied upon against individu-
27  Cf. also Raad van State  March 2006, LJN: AV036.
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als. The Raad van State’s approach here has been severely criticised in the 
literature.28
Like these critics, I cannot agree with the line taken by the Raad van 
State either. The core of its position is that refusing a permit where the 
assessment framework of the national legislation will not allow its refusal 
on grounds of being contrary to a European directive would imply that the 
directive was being directly relied upon against an individual. And this 
would be contrary to the rule against horizontal effect of directives; at least 
this is how I understand the Raad van State’s reasoning. In my view this 
position cannot be implied from ‘rock-hard case law’ of the ECJ.29 In Wells, 
the case cited by the Raad van State, there are on the contrary indications 
that the reverse may be true: negative consequences for the permit holder of 
failure to apply a too limited assessment framework cannot be regarded as a 
prohibited form of ‘inverse direct effect’.30 In my opinion it can be implied 
from Wells and the other case law of the ECJ that the ECJ only has a problem 
with the horizontal effects of provisions of directives when they have not 
been properly implemented, and with possible negative effects for individu-
als when the provisions in question are ones that are intended to create 
obligations for individuals, not when they are intended to create obligations 
for the state.3
Nor do I understand – assuming the Raad van State is right – why an 
administrative authority should be able to refuse a permit where a third 
party invokes a directly effective provision of a directive, but not otherwise. 
Why should there be no horizontal effect where a third party does not rely 
on such a provision, and why should legal certainty not be an issue? The 
implication is that the enforcement of European law is effectively placed 
in the hands of interested third parties, and administrative authorities are 
more or less compelled to take a decision (after all, they cannot refuse to 
do so) which is in effect an unlawful decision conflicting with a European 
directive.32 This surely cannot be the intention of the rule against horizontal 
28  Cf. J.M. Verschuuren, ‘Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak worstelt met rechtstreekse werking 
EG-richtlijnen’, [2003] NTER, pp. 7-77 and H.F.M.W. van Rijswick & R.J.G.M. Widders-
hoven, ‘Een gemiste kans: de tijdelijke vergunning voor de lozing van zwarte-lijststoffen’,            
[2002] Tv�, pp. 232-233.
29  The term ‘keiharde jurisprudentie’ (rock-hard case law) is used by H.G. Sevenster, see J.M. 
Bazelmans & M.N. Boeve (red.), Milieueffectrapportage naar huidig en toekomstig recht 
(Groningen 2006), p. 6.
30  The term is from ECJ Case C-20/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723, para. . 
3  I refer here briefly to ECJ Case C-443/98 Unilever Italia [2000] ECR I-73 and Joined Cases 
C-397/0 to C-403/0 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-883. Cf. on Pfeiffer also the note by S. Prechal 
in [200] CMLRev., pp. 44-463. The judgment in Case C-44/04 Mangold [200] ECR 
I-998, also corresponds precisely with this view.
32  Which, it may be assumed, would itself be a ground for a successful action for damages, 
based inter alia on European law (Francovich liability).
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effect? Or does the Raad van State mean that where a third party relies on 
European law before a court the court will have to reward such reliance? But 
if this is what the Raad van State means, I wonder how this squares with 
the ECJ’s view in Fratelli Costanzo and Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi that 
administrative authorities are basically under the same obligation to apply 
provisions of directives as courts. Admittedly, there is no explicit ECJ case 
law from which it can be implied that administrative authorities are required 
under European law to apply directly effective European law ex officio (in 
other words without the intermediary of an interested party).33 However, the 
view of the Raad van State that refusing a permit where the national assess-
ment framework will not allow its refusal on the ground that it is contrary to 
a European directive would imply that the directive was being directly relied 
upon vis-à-vis an individual, cannot in my view be deduced from Wells or any 
other ECJ case law. In fact it would have made more sense to refer a question 
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on this key issue of the effect of Euro-
pean directives on national law.
	 5	 	Inapplicability	for	Breaches	of	Primary	
Community	Law
The Raad van State’s main argument for not allowing appli-
cation of directly effective European law to the detriment of a person directly 
affected is the rule against horizontal effect of directives. This argument is 
in any event not relevant where the administrative authority is required to 
apply directly effective primary Community law.
Consider the following example. A foreign company applies to the 
regional authority (Gedeputeerde Staten) for the province of Limburg for a 
permit under the �ntgrondingswet (Soil Removal Act) to extract river clay 
from the River Maas. If the permit were not granted, this might well be 
regarded as an obstruction of the free movement of goods (Article 29 EC) or 
services (Article 49 EC). It is quite clear from the case law of the ECJ that an 
administrative authority must take the functioning of the internal market 
into consideration when taking a decision.34 It is possible that this could 
provide an argument for not refusing the permit in this case, on grounds of 
European law. Public interests other than those protected by the �ntgrond-
ingswet would therefore have to form part of the assessment framework 
taken into consideration by the administrative authority.
This is further supported by the decisions of the Raad van State 
discussed above on the planting of Irish and UK mussel seed in the Eastern 
33  See, by contrast, on ex officio application by judicial authorities the judgment in ECJ Case 
C-222/0 Van der Weerd [2007] ECR I-4233. Cf. on this judgment also the contribution of 
Engström to this volume of REALaw.
34  See ECJ Case C-320/03 Commission v. Austria [200] ECR I-987.
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Schelde. Our conclusion there was that the assessment framework of the 
Natuurbeschermingswet, focusing exclusively on conservation, is not extended 
by Article 28 EC Treaty though there was no need for this in those cases 
as the protection of the interests underlying Article 28 was provided by the 
Visserijwet. The question does however arise how the Raad van State would 
act – or would have to act – if for a certain activity only a permit under the 
Natuurbeschermingswet were necessary and to refuse it would be contrary 
to Article 28. In my view the administrative authority would then have to 
ignore the exclusive assessment framework of the Natuurbeschermingswet 
and avoid a conflict with Article 28 by granting the permit. Nor would this 
involve détournement de pouvoir (abuse of power), the other side of the speci-
ality principle.
According to the classical view of the speciality principle public interests 
other than those provided for by the statutory permit system itself cannot 
play a part in decision-making, except when those public interests coincide 
with the interests of the applicant. However, European law requires that it 
(European law) and objectives related to it are taken into consideration in 
decision-making, in order to avoid administrative authorities taking deci-
sions that conflict with primary Community law. This applies even if the 
administrative authority would thereby have to venture outside the national 
assessment framework.
	 6	 Conclusion
The basic principle is that European law does not affect the 
speciality principle as it exists in Dutch administrative law. European law 
does not require that an administrative authority takes all directly effective 
European law into consideration when taking a decision. It does however 
require that situations are avoided where administrative authorities act in 
contravention of European law. In many cases it is possible to ‘stretch’ a too 
limited assessment framework by means of consistent interpretation, so that 
it is possible to take European law into account. However, where particular 
powers and other exclusive assessment frameworks are limited by legislation 
the doctrine of consistent interpretation has little to offer, because in that 
case the result would be a contra legem interpretation of the national assess-
ment framework. And that is not what European law requires either. In this 
kind of situation all that remains is to apply the doctrine of direct effect.
On the basis of the case law of the Raad van State it is possible to draw 
the tentative conclusion that a court may disregard the speciality principle 
if a third party relies on directly effective European law. However, the same 
Raad van State does not regard it as admissible for an administrative authority 
to disregard the principle of its own accord, basing its decision on an assess-
ment framework in a directive that departs from the national law frame-
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work. The reasoning on which the Raad van State bases this view, derived 
from European law, is not convincing and cannot in my view be implied 
from the case law of the ECJ. The Raad van State’s view virtually compels 
administrative authorities to take decisions that conflict with European 
directives. This cannot in my view be the intention.
In other words, it is not true to say that it makes no difference whether 
the speciality principle is disregarded by consistent interpretation or direct 
effect, at least not where provisions of directives are concerned. Where 
consistent interpretation is used, it is national law that is applied in the end, 
and any problems regarding the horizontal effect of provisions of directives 
can be avoided. As discussed above, the Raad van State regards it as prob-
lematic where administrative authorities apply directly effective provisions 
of directives ex officio where this is to the detriment of a person directly 
affected. Where consistent interpretation is used, the basis for the admin-
istrative authority’s decision is found in national law and so no directive is 
applied (horizontally or otherwise).
The rationale of the speciality principle is that administrative authorities 
should not, for reasons of legality and conformity to the rule of law, exercise 
public law powers which the legislature has not declared them competent 
to exercise. The view of the Raad van State that, where European law does 
not provide a basis for competence, administrative authorities may only 
base their powers on national law is one I share.3 But this does not mean, 
as the Raad van State apparently believes, that administrative authorities are 
obliged to grant permits contrary to European law if national law does not 
supply grounds for refusal. This does not serve the legality of the adminis-
tration. Consequently, where a rule of European law requires that certain 
interests are taken into consideration, the speciality principle cannot be 
applied in full.
3  Cf. also Raad van State  January 2006, [2006] NJB, nr. 26.

